A short history of Italian government debt Italy’s titanic national debt, similarly to Rome, was not built in a day. In Italy, like much of Europe, the saga begins benignly in the ashes of World War II. The economic miracles experienced by states such as Greece, Germany and Japan in the 1950s-60s as the countries rebuilt their economies from the ground up (with aid from the US Marshall plan) resulted in two decades of breakneck economic growth. In Italy this period was known as ‘il miracolo economico’. GDP growth averaged just below 6% until 1963 and 5% thereafter until 1973. This boom eventually gave way to fiscal largesse in an attempt to continue the dramatic growth rates and associated quality of life improvements the domestic population had grown accustomed to. With the puncturing of ‘il miracolo’ during the 1973 global oil crisis, subsequent Italian governments borrowed their way to increased prosperity. From the Years of Lead in the 1970s to Rampartism in the 80s and the Second Republic of 1992, Italian debt steadily rose from 30% of GDP, along with real living standards. Italy Debt to GDP ratio 1900-2018. Source: Bloomberg By the early 90s where our overview begins, Italian [...]
The above chart, which is sourced from the Bank Credit Analyst, depicts the deviation from mean real yields since 1980 for the world's major government bond markets. The picture it paints is stark: with a very few exceptions, the valuation of most bond markets stand at more than one standard deviation from long term norms. Some bond markets are approaching or have exceeded two times normal levels. For the kind of new normal described by these valuations to prevail, something definitive and long lasting has to have taken place with regards to inflation. We continue to be of the view that greatest risk facing markets is that either growth or inflation surprises to the upside. Bond markets, inflated by non-price sentive buyers, are now priced for only one environment: pervading disinflation.
Friday, September 26th 2014 will be etched into the memory of followers of investment management companies and fixed income investors alike. Shortly after lunchtime, when London based manager researchers and consultants were probably settling down to an afternoon of email inbox and desk tidying, Janus Capital announced the recruitment of William “Bill” H Gross. Indeed, many will have missed this given the high likelihood of an email from Janus being ignored or deleted (Janus has struggled to reinvent itself after riding the tech bubble up and down and then becoming embroiled in the 2003 market timing scandal). Within minutes the newswires were alive with the news that PIMCO – Bill Gross’ home for the last 43 years - eventually confirmed in a statement which confirmed the general observation that relationships within PIMCOs Investment Committee and with the business heads had become increasingly challenging. This is the “big one” which will have transition managers salivating. Investment manager moves are not uncommon; sometimes they run a few hundred million dollars, maybe a few billion. Occasionally, a manager is responsible for a few tens of billions of dollars. The size of the AUM under a managers’ control will typically determine the workload for [...]